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ABSTRACT 
 
A defining feature of public sector employment is the regular change in elected leadership. Yet, 
we know little about how elections influence public sector careers. We describe how elections 
alter policy outputs and disrupt the influence of civil servants over agency decisions. These 
changes shape the career choices of employees motivated by policy, influence, and wages. Using 
new Office of Personnel Management data on the careers of millions of federal employees 
between 1988 and 2011, we evaluate how elections influence employee turnover decisions. We 
find that presidential elections increase departure rates of career senior employees, particularly in 
agencies with divergent views relative to the new president and at the start of presidential terms. 
We also find suggestive evidence that vacancies in high-level positions after elections may 
induce lower-level executives to stay longer in hopes of advancing. We conclude with 
implications of our findings for public policy, presidential politics, and public management. 
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During the 2016 election year, one quarter of federal employees indicated they would 
consider quitting if Donald Trump were elected president (Katz 2016a). On the other hand, a 
prominent public sector union publicly endorsed Trump and worked actively for his election 
(Katz 2016b). This was the union’s first ever endorsement of a presidential candidate. To one set 
of federal employees the prospect of a Trump presidency was an inducement to leave 
government and to another set a reason to stay. For both groups of civil servants, the election 
itself is a key career event, systematically influencing employee career choices.  
One of the defining features of public sector employment is the regular change in 
executive leadership that coincides with the electoral cycle. Elections can bring dramatic changes 
in the work environments of federal employees, from changes in the mission of the organizations 
to which federal employees give their time and labor to the basics of personnel policy (e.g., size 
of cost-of-living increases, new civil service rules). The public sector consequences of electoral 
politics are very important since significant departures can diminish the expertise in 
administrative agencies and damage the government’s ability to carry out key functions.1  
Given the ubiquity of elections and their impact on the goals and mission of public sector 
workplaces, it is surprising how little is understood about the impact of elections on turnover 
                                                          
1
 There is a large literature on this relationship in the private, not-for-profit, and public sectors 
(see, e.g., Bolton, Potter, and Thrower 2016; Boylan 2004; Hancock et al. 2013; Hausknecht and 
Trevor 2011; Heavy et al. 2013; O’Toole and Meier 2003; Park and Shaw 2013; Shaw 2011). 
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among career civil servants.
2
  Indeed, the feature of public sector work that arguably 
distinguishes it most from work in other sectors is the presence of politics and elections. While 
important work has examined the influence of different administrative factors on turnover in the 
civil service (e.g., work-life balance, communication, engagement), scholars have paid less 
attention to the influence of politics on turnover among public sector employees in the United 
States (see, however, Bertelli and Lewis 2013; Doherty et al 2016).
3
 Fewer still have examined 
how elections influence the career choices of federal employees. While there is widespread 
acceptance of the role of elections in the careers of political appointees (see, e.g., Dickinson and 
Tenpas 2003; O’Connell 2009; Wood and Marchbanks 2008) and an important literature 
examining the relationships between appointees and career civil servants (Aberbach and 
Rockman 1976; Michaels 1997; Golden 2000; Heclo 1977; Resh 2015), little work examines 
how these career events shape the choices of civil servants.  
There is a tension in modern democracy since civil service hiring, promotion, and 
departure are supposed to be insulated from politics, but civil servants may respond to politically 
determined developments in these areas. So while politicians have little direct influence on the 
careers of civil servants, they do indirectly shift the utility certain civil servants receive from 
serving in their jobs. In this paper we describe how elections alter public sector policy outputs 
and reorder patterns of influence within agencies. These disruptions predictably shape the career 
                                                          
2
 There is, however, a robust literature on the causes and consequences of political appointee 
turnover in the public sector (see, e.g., Boyne et al. 2010; Dull and Roberts 2009; Dull et al. 
2012; Hahm et al. 2014; O’Connell 2009; Wood and Marchbanks 2008). 
3
 For works exploring civil service turnover after government changes in other contexts see 
Akhtari et al. n.d.; Boyne et al. 2010; Christensen et al. 2014, Ennser-Jedenastik 2014a. 
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choices of civil servants that care about public policy and agency influence. We use new Office 
of Personnel Management data on the careers of federal employees between 1988 and 2011 to 
evaluate these effects. The results demonstrate that presidential elections increase the departure 
rates of senior federal employees, particularly in agencies whose views diverge from those of the 
new president. This effect is largest at the start of presidential terms. These empirical findings 
validate the importance of elections for public sector personnel and have important implications 
for our understanding of public policy, presidential politics, and public management.   
 
Politics and Employee Turnover 
Given the importance of turnover to the implementation of public policy, scholars have 
carefully studied its causes and consequences. In particular, past research has focused on a 
number of organizational factors, features of employee job contexts, and individual 
characteristics that predict turnover. The organizational factors include characteristics of 
agencies themselves such as agency prestige, structure, management practices, and culture 
(Borjas 1982; Gailmard and Patty 2007; Kellough and Osuna 1995; Pitts et al. 2011; Wilson 
1994). Scholars argue that organizational features influence the non-monetary compensation 
employees receive from working in an agency (Grissom 2015).  
Looking inside organizations, scholars have examined a number of features of the 
employee’s job, including aspects of the work environment—e.g., training, diversity of the 
workforce, engagement, clarity of goals, accountability—that influence departure choices 
(Bertelli 2007; Kim and Fernandez N.d.; Moynihan and Pandey 2007). Perhaps most visibly, 
they have examined how wage differentials, the structure of the labor contract (e.g., pay for 
performance; Bertelli 2007), unionization (Chen and Johnson 2014), and employee-agency fit in 
 5 
the larger labor market influence career choices (Bertelli and Lewis 2013; Cameron et al. 2015). 
Turnover choices are influenced by the expected stream of compensation inside and outside the 
agency. The gap between expected public and private sector wages is determined partly by 
whether employees’ expertise is valued differentially in the public or private sector (Bertelli and 
Lewis 2013; Borjas 1982; Boylan 2004; Grissom et al. 2015; Ippolito 1987). Non-monetary 
forms of compensation controlled by the agency, such as group affinity or work-life balance, can 
also influence the choice to stay or leave.  
The propensity to stay or leave varies by individual and is correlated with characteristics 
of employees themselves. Researchers have explored the influence of a variety of demographic 
factors on turnover, including age or experience (e.g., retirement eligibility, pension vesting), 
gender, and race (Ippolito 1987; Lewis 1991; Lewis and Park 1989; Moynihan and Landuyt 
2008; Pitts et al. 2011). Scholars have also evaluated the impact of different individuals’ public 
service motivation on factors related to turnover and turnover directly (see, e.g., Bright 2008; 
Caillier 2011; Gamassou 2015; Morrison 2012). These works provide a rich and complex picture 
of the different factors that influence turnover decisions across agencies, work groups, and 
individuals.  
Fewer studies explore the ways in which politics itself influences turnover in the U.S. 
civil service. Important work examines how political intervention into administration and policy 
disagreement between career employees and the administration influences turnover (Bertelli and 
Lewis 2013; Brehm and Gates 1997; Cameron et al. 2015; Gailmard and Patty 2007; Golden 
2000; Richardson 2016; Wilson 1994). What remains unclear, however, is how elections and the 
presence of a new administration influence career choices (Doherty et al. 2016). Examining the 
influence of elections on turnover has been difficult because observational data on individual 
 6 
employee careers has been limited and the existing survey data on employee careers and turnover 
intention is cross-sectional. In this paper, however, we make use of unique new observational 
data on all civilian employees working in non-defense agencies between 1988 and 2011 to 
examine this question systematically. 
 
How Do Elections Influence Turnover Decisions? 
The advent of a new presidential administration can lead to significant policy changes 
and alterations in employee influence within agencies. Major party candidates run on platforms 
promising policy changes. Candidates bolster their case with promises of governing with teams 
that will take power away from bureaucrats. Almost all candidates promise to improve economy 
and efficiency in government, cutting expenses and improving performance. The actions that 
follow these promises have predictable effects on the stay or leave choices of federal employees. 
We delineate how elections influence these choices below and more formally in Appendix A. 
 
What Civil Servants Want 
 To begin, it is important to remember that in addition to wages and benefits, federal 
employees care about policy choices. In this way civil servants are similar to other citizens 
except that working in government gives policy issues an imminence and salience rarely shared 
by other voters. Bureaucrats have policy views themselves, particularly about issues in their own 
agencies. Federal employees often self-select into agencies on the basis of their own support for 
an agency’s mission (Clinton et al. 2012). For example, environmentalists are more likely to seek 
employment in the Environmental Protection Agency than the Office of Surface Mining. It is 
important to employees in these agencies that the leadership makes choices that help the 
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organization fulfill its mission. On the other side of the hiring decision, federal agencies have 
incentives to hire, promote, and retain employees whose views about the agency align with the 
agency’s mission. This selection effect can systematically influence the composition of the 
workforce and the views of agency employees (Kaufman 1960, 1981). This is rarely an explicit 
effort to hire Republicans or Democrats. Rather, agencies that prefer hiring engineers vs. 
ecologists or economists vs. sociologists are hiring in ways that are correlated with policy views 
and partisanship. They also engender support for agency mission over any change a new 
administration might bring. 
Federal employees also value the ability to influence their workplace and its choices, 
particularly since agency actions involve the exercise of public authority. Indeed, a large body of 
research explores whether public sector employees are distinctive in the extent to which they are 
motivated by pro-social concerns or what scholars refer to as public service motivation (Perry 
and Wise 1990). The choices of federal employees become increasingly influential in their 
organizations as they advance in their careers and this provides them some utility. Whether they 
agree or disagree about the direction of the agency, both liberal and conservative public sector 
employees value their involvement in agency decisions and a key part of their work enjoyment 
comes from the exercise of authority.  
 
Elections Predictably Affect Employee Utility 
Elections, particularly elections that bring a party change in the White House, lead to 
both policy changes and disruptions in the allocation of influence within agencies. New 
presidents translate their electoral mandate into policy by asserting control of the executive 
establishment through agency review teams established during the transition and by bringing 
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new decision makers into government. These individuals, whether White House staff or political 
appointees in the executive branch, must decide whether to delegate important authority to 
continuing professional personnel. Allowing continuing professional personnel to make 
important decisions can be difficult for new administrations, particularly when career 
professionals worked closely with a previous administration. After elections, presidents or their 
appointees can marginalize some federal employees and favor others (Nathan 1975). Some 
presidential appointees shut careerists out of key policy decisions while others invite career 
professionals to participate in the top-level decisions. Career professionals on the receiving end 
of suspicion or marginalization by a new administration experience a dramatic change in their 
work life in a relatively short period of time. Career executives accustomed to deference and 
respect and empowered with authority are suddenly bypassed and excluded. For some agencies, 
the new administration will take these actions to stop existing policies and initiate new ones 
more congruent with the administration’s preferences. The dramatic effects of a new 
administration on both policy and influence will increase departures after elections. 
 
H1—Elections: The election of a new president will increase departures 
among career executives. 
 
 
The effect of a new administration will not be felt equally across the executive 
establishment. The impacts of transitions are most perceptible in agencies where the new 
administration wants to alter policy dramatically. There is significant variation across the 
government in the policy views of different agencies. The election of a new liberal or 
conservative president will influence the policy choices of agencies differently depending upon 
the policy views of the agency. For example, a new Republican president may instruct the 
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Environmental Protection Agency to reduce regulatory burdens and rely on voluntary programs 
to reduce emissions or the release of pollutants. For other agencies, a new president may simply 
emphasize some agency priorities over others. A new Democratic president, for example, might 
instruct U.S. attorneys to be more attentive to election law violations that keep voters from the 
polls rather than violations that suggest fraudulent access to the polls. When there is a mismatch 
between the policy views of the continuing personnel in the agency and the new president, this 
will increase departure rates. 
 
H2—Agency Mismatch: A mismatch between the ideology of the agency and 
the president will increase departures among career executives. 
 
 
If new administrations decrease the policy influence of career professionals or 
dramatically change policies in ways civil servants do not prefer, this should increase departures. 
Of course, the vast majority of bureaucrats have little influence over the policy choices of their 
agency. The effects of an administration change will be most felt by bureaucrats with the greatest 
influence over and proximity to policy making, particularly those at the top of the agency 
hierarchy. Note that this effect should be evident across agencies that share and do not share the 
president’s policy views. Any loss of influence should increase the propensity of careerists to 
depart. 
 
H3—Hierarchy: The effect of elections on departures will be increasing in 
levels of the hierarchy. 
 
 
The importance of elections as career events for government employees is determined by 
the magnitude of the change brought by the election and characteristics of the employee herself. 
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While employee decisions to stay or leave after an election are determined by whether policy 
moves in a direction they prefer and changes in employee influence on agency decisions, how 
these factors influence employee choices varies from employee to employee. Like other 
employees, public sector employees important value their wages and compensation. Employees 
that value wages more than policy influence may be able to tolerate policy disagreement between 
themselves and the new administration but employees that value policy or influence may not.  
 
Data, Measurement, and Modeling 
In order to evaluate these empirical hypotheses, we use data from the Office of Personnel 
Management’s Central Personnel Data File (CPDF) and Enterprise Human Resources Integration 
system (EHRI) from 1988-2011. This dataset includes the personnel records from 3,511,824 
employees that served in the federal government during the period of our study.
4
 The 
comprehensiveness of the data allows for the estimation of effects within relatively small 
segments of the government with confidence. The dataset includes important demographic 
indicators (including race, gender, and age) as well as human capital information. Information 
about an individual’s work, including their occupation, salary, supervisory status, and their 
organization, is also in the dataset. Further, the records are longitudinal, allowing us to 
characterize an individual’s career dynamics, and importantly, when they exit the federal 
government.  
                                                          
4
 Note that this dataset does not include the Department of Defense, Navy, Army, and Air Force. 
Additionally, individuals that work in classified roles, sensitive agencies, and sensitive 
occupations (as defined by OPM) are excluded. We also exclude all political appointees from the 
analyses in this paper. 
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The key dependent variable that we examine in this analysis is turnover. We define an 
employee as turning over in a given year if it is the last one in which they appear in the CPDF-
EHRI data. In the vast majority of cases, this corresponds to employee exit from the federal 
government. One caveat, however, is that if an employee transitions into a sensitive occupation 
as defined by OPM or to an agency that is not included in our dataset (e.g. the Central 
Intelligence Agency or the Postal Service), they may be mistakenly coded as turning over. 
Unfortunately, there is no way for us to distinguish these cases. However, there is not a clear 
reason to believe that this type of career transition is correlated with the key independent 
variables that we examine in this analysis or is a widespread enough phenomenon to merit 
concern about its potential to confound the results we report. 
To examine H1, we create a dummy variable that takes the value “1” in the first year of a 
presidential administration (i.e. 1989, 1993, 2001, and 2009) and is coded as “0” otherwise. One 
might also think that administration changes may vary in terms of their impacts on employees. In 
particular, changes in the party of the administration may be more likely to have the effects 
discussed above if appointees from a new party are more suspicious of careerists that were in 
government during the previous administration. Because of this, we also examine these partisan 
transitions (that is, 1993, 2001, and 2009) in an alternative analysis (Table B1). 
We use the agency ideology scores developed by Clinton and Lewis (2008) to evaluate 
H2. They surveyed experts on the federal bureaucracy and asked them to rate the ideology of a 
wide range of federal agencies as liberal, conservative, or neither during the period 1988-2005, 
which overlaps substantially with the period of our study. These ratings were then used in a 
multirater item response model to create ideology scores for each agency on a unidimensional 
scale. Following other work that uses these scores (e.g. Lewis 2008), we segment agencies into 
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three groups – conservative (where the entire 95% credible interval of the ideology estimate is 
greater than zero), moderate (where the 95% credible interval includes zero), and liberal (where 
the 95% credible interval is wholly less than zero). Agencies are coded as being “ideologically 
mismatched” if they are conservative during a Democratic presidency or if they are liberal during 
a Republican presidency. 
H3 requires us to separate out employees that have differential levels of policy influence. 
In order to do this, we consider four different groups of employees in all of the analyses below: 
the career Senior Executive Service (SES), individuals in supervisory roles,
5
 General Schedule 
(GS) employees in grades 13-15, and all employees. We expect the career SES to have the most 
policy influence and work in closest proximity to political appointees and members of the 
president’s administration. Therefore, we anticipate that they will evince the greatest levels of 
sensitivity to ideological mismatch and transitions. GS 13-15 employees as well as those in 
supervisory roles are less likely to have policy influence relative to the career SES, but they still 
may be involved in policy decisions and sometimes interface with administration officials. We 
expect that the final group, all employees, to be least sensitive to elections and ideology. 
In addition to the key independent variables discussed above, we also include a number 
of control variables in our analyses that could also impact the propensity of employees to leave 
the government. First, we use the geographic location information in the OPM data to merge in 
data on the seasonally adjusted September unemployment rate in the states where employees 
work. We collected this data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Local Area Unemployment 
                                                          
5
 The supervisor category is fairly broad and definitions have changed over time. We code 
individuals that are designated as “supervisor or manager,” “supervisor (CSRA),” “management 
official (CSRA),” “leader,” or “team leader” in the OPM dataset as supervisors in our analyses. 
 13 
Statistics Reports for 1988-2011.
6
 Here, we use unemployment as a proxy for the strength of the 
local economy and labor demand in the area where an employee works. We expect that turnover 
is decreasing in this variable. We have also estimated models with other ways of accounting for 
the strength of the private sector labor market and wages, including fixed effects for 
combinations of more than 800 occupation codes with hundreds of geographic locations (see 
Tables B3 - B5 in Appendix B). The results in these specifications are similar to what is reported 
in the main text. 
We control for demographic factors that have been shown or hypothesized to increase 
public sector turnover rates (e.g. Moynihan and Landuyt 2008). In all of the regression models 
reported below, we included the employee’s age as well as its square. Additionally, all models 
include a dummy variable for whether or not an employee is a woman to capture any potential 
gender-based differences in turnover. We also include indicators for four racial groups identified 
by the Office of Personnel Management over time: American Indian/Alaska Native (reported as 
A.I./A.N. in the tables below); Asian; Black; and Hispanic.
7
 The omitted category is White.  
In addition to demographics, we also control for the level of education that an employee 
has attained in a given year. The original OPM CPDF-EHRI data divides education level into 
twenty-two different categories. In the analyses reported below we create a single, continuous 
measure of educational attainment that corresponds to the number of years past 12th grade 
completed by employees. This simplifies interpretations, but we also note that including these 22 
                                                          
6
 http://www.bls.gov/lau/ 
7
 Note that we use these categories in order to capture consistent racial categories over time. This 
requires us to aggregate some racial categories during some periods because of inconsistencies in 
how racial data has been collected by the federal government over time. 
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categories as indicator variables or in a somewhat more aggregated form (e.g. high school, B.A., 
M.A., etc.) does not substantively alter the results that we report below. Finally, all of the models 
incorporate two additional sets of dummy variables in the analysis for the agency in which an 
employee works as well as their four-digit occupation code.
8
 These fixed effects account for time 
invariant occupation and agency characteristics that may impact turnover, such as private-public 
wage differentials for given occupations or the premium placed on government experience in a 
given policy area or occupation. 
To evaluate our hypotheses, we estimate a series of linear probability models, where the 
outcome variable is whether or not an employee chooses to leave in a given year.
9
 In order to 
account for duration dependence, we include a set of dummy variables for the number of years 
that an individual has been in government (i.e. tenure fixed effects). The estimates for these 
effects are akin to a baseline hazard rate in a survival model. Additionally, to capture any global 
time trends in departure rates, we include a cubic polynomial in time in all model 
specifications.
10
 Finally, in order to account for the correlated error structure and dependence 
                                                          
8
 This is the most disaggregated occupation code that OPM uses. There are 803 unique 
occupations in our dataset. 
9
 We focus on the results of linear probability models given estimation difficulties associated 
with computing coefficients from logistic regressions or Cox proportional hazards models using 
such a large dataset and large numbers of fixed effects for, in some cases, relatively small 
groups. These factors make the convergence of maximum likelihood estimators difficult and 
require substantial computing power for estimation. 
10
 The results we report are robust to other functional forms for the time trend, including a linear 
trend or quadratic trend. The results are also not affected by excluding the time trend variable. 
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that exists when observing the same employees in many different years, we cluster all standard 
errors at the individual employee level. We now turn to describing the results of these analyses. 
 
Results 
Table 1, below, includes the results of the turnover models described above. All of the 
results are separated into four groups of employees – all employees, GS 13-15, supervisors, and 
career SES employees. We include coefficient estimates and t-values for all variables. Overall, 
the results show support for the three hypotheses although with some interesting nuance. The 
career choices of civil servants at the highest levels appear most responsive to changes in policy 
and influence stemming from elections. Civil servants at lower levels are more insulated from 
changes brought by elections as expected. In fact, some changes may work to their benefit if the 
departure of their superiors opens up new job opportunities for them. 
We begin with the results of our analyses relevant to testing H1. The estimated 
coefficients for the Year 1 variable provide the key test for this hypothesis. Recall, we predict 
that individuals will be more likely to depart during the first year of a new administration. We 
find support for this idea in two groups of employees – individuals in supervisory roles as well as 
career SES employees. Both are estimated to have higher levels of turnover in the first year of a 
new administration. Career SES employees seem to be most sensitive to a new president with an 
average increase of 1.6 percentage points in the first year of a new administration relative to 
other years. The number is significantly less for supervisory employees, though still in the 
expected direction – a 0.2 percentage point increase in the probability of turning over in 
transition years. To put this in perspective, this would mean the departure of an additional 528 
supervisors and 100 members of Senior Executive Service. These are officials at the very highest 
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levels of government, filling roles such as Deputy Assistant Secretary, Chief Information 
Officer, and Administrator of the Foreign Agricultural Service. 
We see results in the opposite direction for the other two groups of employees that we 
examine – all and GS 13-15. In particular, turnover propensity is estimated to decrease by 0.1 
percentage points for all employees, and by 0.4 percentage points for employees in GS grades 
13-15. These latter two results are not consistent with our theoretical predictions, though for all 
employees the effect is very small. The Year 1 effect for GS 13-15 employees is substantively 
larger and gestures toward one possibility that is not captured by the theory. With high levels of 
churn in the career SES during the beginning of a new administration, there may be new 
opportunities for promotion for individuals directly below the Senior Executive Service level, 
leading GS 13-15 employees to stay in the government to vie for these new openings. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
 
In addition to testing whether or not the first year of an administration is associated with 
increased turnover, we also examined whether partisan changes in administration had similar 
effects. The results of this analysis are reported in Table B1 (in Appendix B) and are 
substantively identical to the ones that we report here. Indeed, the estimates for the effect of a 
change in presidential administration are larger for career SES members. 
Now, we turn our attention to the results for the test of H2. Across all four groups, there 
is a positive and statistically significant estimated coefficient for the ideological mismatch 
variable. This is consistent with the hypothesis, suggesting that individuals’ propensity for 
turnover is increased for employees in agencies with ideological orientations that differ from that 
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of the presidential administration. In particular, the estimated increase in turnover propensity is 
0.4 percentage points for all employees; 0.1 percentage points for employees in GS grades 13-15; 
0.3 percentage points for employees that serve in supervisory capacities; and 0.6 percentage 
points for career senior executives in any given year of ideological mismatch relative to 
employees in agencies where there is no such mismatch. While seemingly small, these effects 
should be considered relative to baseline turnover propensities, which are not large. The average 
levels of turnover for each of the four groups of employees in a given year from 1988-2011 is 
6.2%, 4.4%, 5.5%, and 8.0% for all employees, GS 13-15, supervisors, and the career SES, 
respectively. Thus, for example, the 0.6 percentage point increase for career SES employees is a 
7.5% increase in the baseline propensity for turnover. Furthermore, one must also consider that 
these effects are for any given year. Increased turnover propensities will compound over time to 
create much larger differential effects over the course of a four or eight-year administration. 
Overall, then, the results in Table 1 provide strong support for H2.  
While the results in Table 1 give a sense of the mismatch effect averaged over the course 
of a president’s term, they do not necessarily capture the temporal aspects of the mismatch effect 
that we would expect in the case that elections are playing a central role in structuring employee 
decisions about turnover. In particular, we expect that the mismatch effect is most prominent in 
beginning years of a new administration and that it lessens over the course of a president’s term. 
In order to assess this hypothesis, we interacted the mismatch variable with indicator variables 
for the year of president’s term --i.e., 1 through 8--and the estimates are included in Table 2.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
[Insert Table 2 about here.] 
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Figure 1 plots the estimated effect of mismatch in a given year of a presidential 
administration based on the interaction models. As can be seen, the effect is concentrated at the 
beginning of presidential administrations. In particular, we observe the positive mismatch effect 
for all four groups being the greatest during the first three years of a president’s administration, 
indicating that the temporal dynamics surrounding elections and transitions are driving behavior. 
Furthermore, these effect sizes are significantly larger in some cases than the average effect 
estimated in Table 1. For example, in the third year of a presidential administration, there is an 
increase of 1.85 percentage points in the probability a career SES employee will leave the federal 
government if they are in a mismatched agency relative to one who is not. This is a 23% increase 
from the baseline departure rate. After the first three years of an administration, however, the 
mismatch effect tends toward zero for all groups of employees that we examine. For two groups 
of employees, supervisors and career SES employees, the mismatch effect actually reverses 
somewhat substantially at least in some years during the second term. Though our theory does 
not shed light on this result, it could suggest that, in some cases, career employees are more 
empowered by political appointees the longer they remain with an administration. As before, 
career SES employees appear to be the most responsive to ideological mismatch, with the other 
three groups showing less pronounced effects, though still positive. 
 Turning now to Hypothesis 3, we do find hierarchy effects in our analysis of the turnover 
decision. In particular, career SES employees are most responsive to both ideological 
mismatches between their agency and the administration as well as to changes in administrations. 
This is strongly in line with our theoretical expectations. Career SES employees tend to serve at 
the upper echelons of the agency hierarchy and are the career employees that are most likely to 
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interact with political appointees in terms of the substance of their work on a regular basis (see, 
for example, Resh 2015).  
The effects are less pronounced when examining the other three groups. In particular 
employees in grades 13-15 of the GS show the lowest sensitivity to ideological mismatches and 
are more likely to stay in government in the first year of a new administration. While slightly at 
odds with our theoretical expectations, both factors may be explained by the promotion-seeking 
conjecture discussed above. Supervisory employees have approximately equal sensitivity to 
mismatches as employees as a whole but are more likely to leave in the first year of 
administration, while all employees actually are more likely to stay in government after an 
administration transition. Thus, we find significant support for the hierarchy hypothesis, with 
career SES employees appearing extremely sensitive to the political dynamics in the theory. 
Further down the leadership ladder of the agency, things tend to converge much more. This may 
suggest that the political effects we explore in this paper are less perceptible to these employees 
and/or there are other career concerns at play that cause employees to act differently than career 
SES employees in order to obtain promotions. 
 Finally, we turn to discussing some of the control variables in our analyses. First, we 
examine the extent to which economic concerns structure employee decision-making with 
respect to turnover. As discussed above, we proxy for the labor demand and wages that an 
employee could expect to earn with the local unemployment rate in the place where they work in 
a given year. As unemployment increases, we expect decreasing turnover propensity. For three 
of the four groups that we analyze we see results in line with this expectation. In particular, all 
employees, supervisors, and career SES employees are less likely to leave government as the 
unemployment rate in the state where they work increases. These effects are substantively large 
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relative to the other ones that we estimate. For example, an increase of 1% in the unemployment 
rate in a given state decreases the probability of a career SES employee that state leaving the 
government by 0.2 percentage points. The unemployment variables ranges from 2.2% 
(Connecticut, September 2000) to 14% (Michigan, September 2009) in our dataset, so these 
effects can be quite substantively large. The results for GS 13-15 group of employees are out of 
line with our expectation. We estimate a positive correlation between unemployment and 
turnover for this group, though the effect size is significantly smaller in magnitude than what we 
estimate for the other three groups of employees. 
We also find that federal employees with higher levels of education and minority 
employees are generally less likely to depart in any given year than Whites. One exception, 
however, is American Indian/Alaska Native employees, who we find are more likely to leave 
government than white employees in three of the four groups of employees we analyze. Further, 
we find that younger employees are less likely to depart.  
More central to our purposes here, however, the estimates substantially confirm 
expectations. They reveal that presidential elections increase the departure rates of federal 
employees, particularly in agencies whose views diverge from those of the new president and for 
employees higher in the hierarchy. Not surprisingly, compensation differentials between the 
public and private sectors also influence the probability of departure among federal employees.  
In Appendix B, we include the results from a number of robustness checks and 
alternative model specifications that account for partisan dynamics in administration changes 
(Table B1); more flexible accounting for age using age fixed effects (Table B2); and different 
ways of capturing the effects of local labor markets on turnover propensity (Tables B3, B4, and 
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B5). Across all of these alternative models, we find results that are substantively similar to those 
reported in Table 1. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Elections and partisan transitions are a central feature of American administration. They 
can bring about new policy directions and cast aside old ideas, lending dynamism and 
uncertainty to public policy. While presidents and their appointees cycle in and out of leadership 
roles in the executive branch, career officials are thought to play a stabilizing role, supporting 
new leaders but also providing continuity for agencies and their missions. This, in theory, allows 
for organizational effectiveness even in the face of changing policy priorities, giving new leaders 
the opportunity to implement their programs.  
However, these career employees are not necessarily ideologically neutral actors, 
mechanically carrying out the will of their appointed leaders. Rather, they often have well-
developed policy preferences and can select into agencies that have missions congenial with their 
views. Thus, when presidents from parties opposed to an agency’s ideological orientation come 
into office, there can be significant policy losses associated with implementing policy from the 
perspective of the employee. These dynamics are likely to be especially acute for employees 
higher in the administrative hierarchy and those who value policy and influence significantly. 
This reduced utility from their work in the government creates situations in which private sector 
employment (or other options, such as retirement) become more attractive to career employees. 
In this way, elections and partisan changes can have important impacts on the career concerns of 
federal employees and potentially affect the capacity of organizations. These ideas form the 
backbone of the theoretical framework that we advance in this paper.  
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Our analysis confirms many of these empirical hypotheses. Indeed, employees working 
in agencies where is a significant divergence from the ideological outlook of the administration 
are more likely to leave in any given year. This effect is particularly large in the first three years 
of an administration and for the group of employees that has the most direct contact with the 
administration – career senior executives. This suggests that political disagreements can lead to 
churn at the top of the career civil service. Additionally, the first years of an administration are 
associated with higher average levels of turnover for employees across all agencies for career 
SES and supervisory employees, which is in line with the theoretical notion that civil servants 
from a previous administration are often viewed with suspicion by new political appointees and 
thus cut out of the policy process. Further, we find some evidence that these effects are different 
for different groups of employees. In particular, the political dynamics we describe appear most 
perceptible to career Senior Executives, for whom we estimate the largest magnitude effects. 
 Overall, this paper makes a number of contributions to our understanding of politics and 
administration in the United States. First, it brings elections and ideology to the fore, 
demonstrating ways in which they can powerfully influence employee career concerns and 
decision-making about their labor. Second, we demonstrate that employees situated throughout 
the agency hierarchy may be differentially responsive to these political factors. Finally, our 
analyses use administrative records to systematically study actual turnover, an improvement over 
work that has been forced to rely on turnover intention in surveys or small groups of employees 
due to data limitations. 
 The results in this paper also raise a number of questions that could be profitably pursued 
in future work. First, as discussed above, the results for GS 13-15 employees raise a number of 
interesting issues surrounding hierarchy and the potentially different incentives that this group of 
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workers faces. In particular, if career SES employees increase their turnover propensity in 
response to political factors, then this potentially opens up opportunities for other employees to 
advance. In that case, these two groups of employees could potentially behave in different ways 
in equilibrium. A more general theory of overall organizational dynamics and career concerns 
would be required to illuminate this possibility and would be a fruitful avenue of research. 
 Another area of potential interest concerns how elected officials and appointees might 
respond to negative reactions by careerists in order to stem personnel losses. If turnover, 
particularly at top levels of an organization, negatively impacts performance (at least in the 
short-term) then actors may employ some management strategies to mitigate the utility losses 
associated with turnover. Exploring how employee behavior affects administration incentives 
and how appointees respond in this context would be an important contribution to our 
understanding of the administrative presidency and public management. 
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Table 1: Regression Models of Turnover for Four Groups of Employees 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Year 1 -0.001 
(-8.28) 
-0.004 
(-12.42) 
0.002 
(6.95) 
0.016 
(7.12) 
Ideological 
Mismatch 
0.004 
(21.96) 
0.001 
(3.39) 
0.003 
(9.20) 
0.006 
(2.73) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-0.001 
(-20.62) 
2.71 x 10
-4
 
(2.99) 
-0.001 
(-9.51) 
-0.002 
(-3.53) 
Female -0.003 
(-23.79) 
0.001 
(2.97) 
0.001 
(2.96) 
4.52 x 10
-4
 
(0.24) 
A.I./A.N. 0.003 
(6.75) 
0.003 
(2.81) 
0.003 
(2.71) 
-2.02 x 10
-4
 
(-0.02) 
Asian -0.010 
(-31.82) 
-0.009 
(-17.68) 
-0.009 
(-11.05) 
-0.011 
(-1.86) 
Black -0.006 
(-40.84) 
-0.011 
(-28.39) 
-0.009 
(-22.84) 
-0.016 
(-5.64) 
Hispanic -0.004 
(-17.37) 
-0.002 
(-3.97) 
-0.004 
(-6.47) 
-0.006 
(-1.24) 
Age -0.016 
(-280.13) 
-0.014 
(-87.12) 
-0.015 
(-77.53) 
-0.011 
(-6.79) 
Age
2
 1.99 x 10
-4
 
(304.65) 
1.70 x 10
-4 
(93.83) 
1.92 x 10
-4
 
(91.11) 
1.39 x 10
-4
 
(8.78) 
Education -3.94 x 10
-4
 
(-11.55) 
-1.49 x 10
-4
 
(-2.12) 
-0.002 
(-21.51) 
-0.002 
(-3.75) 
     
Tenure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cubic Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group All Employees GS 13-15 Supervisors Career SES 
N 17,529,543 2,618,289 2,788,868 103,346 
This table includes the estimated coefficients from turnover models for four groups of employees – all, GS 
13-15, employees in a supervisory role, and career Senior Executive Service employees. T-ratios based on 
robust standard errors clustered by employee are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 2: Conditional Mismatch Effects 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ideological 
Mismatch 
0.003 
(10.42) 
1.75 x 10
-4
 
(0.26) 
0.003 
(4.51) 
0.013 
(2.79) 
Mismatch x  
Year 2 
0.007 
(16.26) 
0.002 
(2.61) 
0.010 
(10.17) 
-0.002 
(-0.27) 
Mismatch x  
Year 3 
0.004 
(8.86) 
0.006 
(5.37) 
0.005 
(4.52) 
0.005 
(0.88) 
Mismatch x  
Year 4 
-0.002 
(-4.69) 
-1.23 x 10
-5
 
(-0.01) 
-0.004 
(-3.60) 
-0.009 
(-1.39) 
Mismatch x  
Year 5 
-0.005 
(-9.94) 
-4.57 x 10
-4
 
(-0.41) 
-0.011 
(-8.09) 
-0.032 
(-4.10) 
Mismatch x  
Year 6 
-0.005 
(-10.22) 
-0.002 
(-1.39) 
-0.007 
(-5.04) 
-0.018 
(-2.28) 
Mismatch x 
Year 7 
-0.004 
(-7.18) 
-3.05 x 10
-4
 
(-0.29) 
-0.006 
(-5.01) 
-0.015 
(-1.95) 
Mismatch x  
Year 8 
-0.001 
(-1.41) 
0.001 
(0.71) 
-0.001 
(-1.06) 
-0.011 
(-1.68) 
     
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tenure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cubic Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group All Employees GS 13-15 Supervisors Career SES 
N 17,529,543 2,618,289 2,788,868 103,346 
This table includes the estimated coefficients from the interaction between the mismatch variable and the 
indicators for the year of term for four groups of employees – all, GS 13-15, employees in a supervisory role, 
and career Senior Executive Service employees. All other variables that are used in Table 1 are also included 
in these specifications. T-ratios based on robust standard errors clustered by employee are reported in 
parentheses.  
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Figure 1. Ideological Mismatch Effect by Year of Term. This figure plots the interaction effects that we 
estimate in Table 2. The mismatch effect appears to be concentrated in the beginning of new administrations. 
In particular, the mismatch effect appears to be concentrated mostly in the first three years of a new 
administration, further demonstrating the role that elections and transitions have on employee turnover 
decisions. 
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Appendix A. Formal Representation of Departure Decision 
In this Appendix, we outline a slightly more formal approach that underlies the theory 
found in the paper.  We begin by assuming that individuals value wages and policy outcomes so 
that the utility of an individual is given by: 
2)ˆ)(1( iaiijiij xxu        (1) 
where iju  is the utility of individual i in her job j where },{ pbj  where b is a job as a 
bureaucrat and p is a job in the private sector, i is the weight an individual places on wages (vs. 
policy outcomes) such that 10  i , ij  is the wage of individual i in job j,  axˆ is the (induced) 
ideal point of the agency, and ix  is the individual’s ideal policy where ia xx ,ˆ . Individuals 
have single peaked and quadratic preferences over policy outcomes in a unidimensional policy 
space. The first term of Equation 1 is the utility the individual receives from wages.  The second 
term is the utility she receives from policy outcomes—the closer the agency’s policy outcome is 
to her ideal point, the better off she is.  If the individual only values wages, 1i , then the utility 
she receives is derived from just the wage; if the individual only values policy ( 0i ), then the 
utility function depends only upon the difference in the (induced) ideal points of the individual 
and the agency. 
Individuals may have influence over agency induced ideal points.  In particular, the 
induced ideal point of the agency is: 
aijiija xxx )1(ˆ         (2) 
where axˆ  is the induced ideal point of the agency as before, ix is the ideal point of the individual 
as before, and ax is the agency ideal point of agency presidential appointee or administration, 
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ax .   An individual’s i influence in job j over agency policymaking is characterized by ij , 
which we will characterize further momentarily.   
   For notational simplicity going forward, let Xxx ia  )( .  Substituting equation 2 into 
equation 1 and simplifying, we generate the general utility function: 
   )()1)(1(
22 Xu ijiijiij       (3) 
 We can now consider two cases.  In the first case, consider the individual choosing to 
work in government as a bureaucrat (j = b).  In this case, the utility function of a bureaucrat can 
be characterized very similar to equation 3 as: 
)()1)(1( 22 Xu ibiibiib       (4) 
The bureaucrat receives weighted utility from the government wage ib (first term) and from her 
preference relative to the induced agency preference (second term).  The influence a bureaucrat 
exerts over policy, ib , is assumed to be inversely related to the distance between the ideal 
points of the presidential appointee and the bureaucrat. There are a number of ways to model 
such a relationship. We choose here an example that mirrors how careerist influence works in 
practice, namely that the influence of the bureaucrat reaches a maximum when the ideal points 
are very close, and then the influence stays at that same level as the ideal points of the bureaucrat 
and political appointee continue to converge zero. To characterize such an effect we let the 
influence 41Xij
  if 𝑋2 ≥ (
2
3−√5
)
1
2⁄
≈ 1.618, , and 1ij  otherwise.   We call this 
constraint C1.  This means for all permissible values of ix and ax , it will be the case that 
10  ib  and the bureaucrat will have some influence over agency induced ideal points. As a 
general matter, it is important to choose from a class of functional forms that constrain the 
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influence of the individual over policy to decline faster than the individual’s utility of the policy 
(in this case a quadratic utility function) in 𝑋. Intuitively, we need to assume that a careerist’s 
influence decreases as the ideological distance between the careerist and the 
appointee/administration increases. That is, a careerist is increasingly marginalized as their views 
diverge from the administration.     
 The second case is if the individual instead chooses to go to the private sector.  In that 
case the utility function is: 
)()1)(1( 22 Xu ipiipiip       (5) 
where the p subscript is for a private sector job.  Note, however, that by choosing a private sector 
job, the individual obtains the private sector wage, but loses her ability to influence the agency’s 
ideal point.  Said differently, private sector workers have .0ip
11
  This then reduces the private 
sector utility function to: 
))(1( 2Xu iipiip        (6) 
An individual will choose to work for the government iff ipib uu  . 
We can now conduct comparative statics.  It may be useful at this point to note that the 
difference in utility of an individual working in the government and the private sector, using 
equations 4 and 6, can be written as:   
))(1]()1(1[)( 22 Xuu iibipibiipib      (7a) 
simplifying we obtain: 
)2)(1()( 2
3
2
1
ibibiipibiipib uu       (7b) 
                                                          
11
 We assume that in the absence of this individual, the induced policy outcome will be 𝑥𝑎.  One way to interpret this 
result is that when a senior person leaves the government, the political appointee has no one to rely on for expertise 
and just chooses a policy close to his ideal point.  Another way to interpret this is that the second term of the utility 
of the function is the utility that the bureaucrat obtains from actually making policy ?̂?𝑎. 
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For notational simplicity, we suppress the i subscript where not needed and substitute for 
substituting ib as noted earlier.  The first comparative static (first and third hypotheses in the 
paper) is to examine how changes in the ability of a bureaucrat to influence the agency’s induced 
ideal point affects the bureaucrat’s utility.  In particular: 

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Equation 8 is weakly positive across all ranges of the function with the constraint C1.  Said 
differently, as a bureaucrat’s influence over policy outcomes increases, her utility rises and 
reaches a peak, where her influence stays.  This means a bureaucrat in induced to (weakly) stay 
in her government job (reducing departure rates) as the bureaucrat’s influence increases. 
The second comparative static (second hypothesis in the paper) considers changes in the 
distance between the ideal points of the administration and the individuals.  We can examine this 
by taking the derivative of the utility difference with respect to the squared-distance between the 
ideal points of the actors.
12
  Using the chain rule and implicit function theorem, we can show: 
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The derivative in equation 9 is weakly negative for all values of 𝑋2 with the constraint C1.  This 
means as ix  and ax move apart, that is the distance between the individual’s ideal point and the 
administration’s ideal point rises, bureaucrats receive weakly less utility from the policy 
component of their utility function and are more likely to leave the government.   
A final comparative static examines how changes in private sector wages affect the 
willingness of the bureaucrat to stay in the government.  To analyze this we take: 
                                                          
12
 We use 𝑋2 instead of 𝑋 as a distance measure to ensure the distance measure is always positive. 
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Equation 10 shows as private sector wages rise, the utility to staying in the government declines 
and bureaucrats will tend to leave government and move into the private sector.  This final result 
is a theoretically heartening check of the model, consistent with the basic tenets of labor 
economics. 
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Appendix B. Additional Empirical Results and Robustness Checks 
In this appendix, we provide additional empirical results that employ alternative 
measurements of some variables of interest as well as alternative model specifications that are 
referenced throughout the paper. A description of each of the additional analyses is provided 
below, and the tables are included in the pages following: 
In Table B1, we examine an alternative way to measure administration change. In 
particular, the most salient type of administration change for career decisions may be those 
where the new administration is of a different party. This was the case in 1993, 2001, and 2009. 
In order to assess whether there are differences in the Year 1 result when examining party 
changes, in this table, we include an indicator for party change in administration rather than the 
general administration change variable used in the main text. As can be seen in Table B1, the 
results are substantively the same as those reported in Table 1. The results for supervisors and 
career SES employees follow the empirical hypotheses derived from the theory (higher departure 
rates during administration changes), while the results for all employees and GS 13-15 
employees are in the opposite direction. In the main text, we offer one plausible explanation for 
these divergent results grounded in the idea that career SES departures open up opportunities for 
advancement for other employees lower in the managerial hierarchy in an agency. 
 Table B2 offers the results of analyses where we include fixed effects for each observed 
age in the dataset instead of the quadratic polynomial in age that is included in the results 
reported in the main text. While in our main specifications we followed the previous literature by 
including both age and its square, in Table B2, we relax any assumptions about functional forms 
of the relationship between age and turnover. This, for instance, should alleviate any concerns 
about ages where there may be non-monotonicities or big spikes or declines in turnover (e.g. 
massive increase in turnover at age 65). As can be seen, the substance of the results reported in 
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the main text are unaffected by this alternative method of accounting for an employee’s age in a 
given year. The magnitudes and precision of the estimates are nearly identical to those reported 
in Table 1. 
 Tables B3, B4, and B5 all take different approaches to modeling how the local labor 
market might impact the turnover decisions of bureaucrats. In the main text, we use the 
unemployment rate in an individual’s location to proxy for the relative labor demand in the area, 
which has an impact on decisions about leaving the government for the private sector.  
 First, Table B3 includes occupation category-state fixed effects. There are six 
occupational categories (administrative, blue collar, clerical, professional, other white collar, and 
technical) and 51 “states” (including Washington, DC), which leads to 306 total additional 
categories. Including this additional set of fixed effects allows us to estimate the effect of 
unemployment within these categories given that changes in labor demand may be differentially 
felt by individuals in different types of occupations. Even after including these additional fixed 
effects, the results from the main analyses hold and are similar again in terms of both magnitude 
and precision. Across all groups of employees, ideological mismatches between the 
administration and the agency are associated with greater turnover propensities. The first year of 
a new administration is associated with higher turnover for career SES employees and 
supervisors but not for the other two groups that we examine, consistent with the results reported 
in the main text. 
 In a similar vein, Table B4 includes the estimated coefficients from models in which we 
include occupation-specific effects of unemployment in the local area. These effects are created 
by including interaction terms between the unemployment variable and each of the 803 specific 
occupation codes in our dataset. This allows us to estimate separate effects of unemployment for 
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every occupation type given that some occupations may be more or less sensitive to changes in 
labor demand overall in the economy. Fortunately, the results of these analyses do not appear to 
change any of the substantive conclusions that we reach in the paper.  
 Finally, the results of the specifications reported in Table B5 include occupational 
category-year-state fixed effects. There are 7,028 possible categories (6 occupational categories 
x 23 years x 51 “states”). These thousands of additional effects in the model are meant to capture 
labor demand and expected wages in an employee’s area without using a proxy variable (i.e. 
unemployment rate). We no longer include unemployment rate or the indicator for the first year 
or a new administration in the model because of perfect collinearity with this set of fixed effects. 
Therefore, this particular robustness check only interrogates the mismatch results from the main 
text. As can be seen, the results of this analysis are generally supportive of those reported in 
Table 1. Most reassuringly, all of the estimated coefficients for the mismatch variable are in the 
same direction as those reported in the main text; that is, employees in mismatched organizations 
are more likely to leave the federal government in any given year. The addition of these fixed 
effects do, however, lead to somewhat smaller effect sizes, and are, unsurprisingly, less precisely 
estimated given the smaller amounts of variation within these thousands of cells. This is 
particularly true in the analyses with smaller numbers of observations. However, the results do 
point to similar substantive conclusions about the effect of ideological mismatch on turnover 
propensity. 
 Overall these results lend additional credence to those presented in the main text. Across 
a number of alternative ways of operationalizing key variables, alternative specifications, and 
different strategies for accounting for local economies, the results remain consistent with those 
reported in Table 1. 
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Table B1: Party Change Models 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Party Change -0.003 
(-15.89) 
-0.006 
(-15.38) 
0.002 
(4.93) 
0.019 
(6.94) 
Ideological 
Mismatch 
0.004 
(22.03) 
0.001 
(3.39) 
0.003 
(9.25) 
0.006 
(2.77) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-0.001 
(-18.07) 
3.89 x 10
-4
 
(4.24) 
-0.001 
(-9.60) 
-0.002 
(-4.22) 
Female -0.003 
(-23.77) 
0.001 
(2.96) 
0.001 
(2.96) 
4.93 x10
-4
 
(0.26) 
A.I./A.N. 0.003 
(6.72) 
0.003 
(2.81) 
0.003 
(2.71) 
-2.48 x 10
-4
 
(-0.03) 
Asian -0.010 
(-31.92) 
-0.009 
(-17.70) 
-0.009 
(-11.05) 
-0.011 
(-1.85) 
Black -0.006 
(-40.97) 
-0.011 
(-28.44) 
-0.009 
(-22.83) 
-0.015 
(-5.63) 
Hispanic -0.004 
(-17.45) 
-0.002 
(-3.97) 
-0.004 
(-6.47) 
-0.006 
(-1.24) 
Age -0.016 
(-280.12) 
-0.014 
(-87.12) 
-0.015 
(-77.53) 
-0.011 
(-6.78) 
Age
2
 1.99 x 10
-4
 
(304.63) 
-1.51 x 10
-4
 
(93.83) 
1.92 x 10
-4
 
(91.11) 
1.38 x 10
-4
 
(8.77) 
Education -3.95 x 10
-4
 
(-11.59) 
-1.51 x 10
-4
 
(-2.14) 
-0.002 
(-21.50) 
-0.002 
(-3.75) 
     
Tenure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cubic Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group All Employees GS 13-15 Supervisors Career SES 
N 17,529,543 2,618,289 2,788,868 103,346 
This table includes the estimated coefficients from turnover models for four groups of employees – all, GS 
13-15, employees in a supervisory role, and career Senior Executive Service employees. Instead of modeling 
changes in administration, here we use an indicator for years in which there is a party change. T-ratios based 
on robust standard errors clustered by employee are reported in parentheses.  
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Table B2: Fixed Effects for Age 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Year 1 -0.001 
(-8.39) 
-0.004 
(-12.38) 
0.002 
(6.87) 
0.016 
(7.12) 
Ideological 
Mismatch 
0.003 
(21.76) 
0.001 
(3.31) 
0.003 
(9.00) 
0.006 
(2.78) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-0.001 
(-20.16) 
2.84 x 10
-4
 
(3.14) 
-0.001 
(-9.34) 
-0.002 
(-3.57) 
Female -0.003 
(-23.61) 
0.001 
(3.60) 
0.001 
(2.95) 
0.001 
(0.40) 
A.I./A.N. 0.002 
(6.41) 
0.003 
(2.70) 
0.002 
(2.58) 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
Asian -0.010 
(-32.92) 
-0.009 
(-17.59) 
-0.009 
(-11.31) 
-0.011 
(-1.99) 
Black -0.007 
(-42.54) 
-0.011 
(-28.85) 
-0.010 
(-23.31) 
-0.015 
(-5.65) 
Hispanic -0.005 
(-18.17) 
-0.003 
(-4.07) 
-0.004 
(-6.43) 
-0.006 
(-1.20) 
Education -3.77 x 10
-4
 
(-11.08) 
-1.85 x 10
-4
 
(-2.64) 
-0.002 
(-21.58) 
-0.002 
(-4.10) 
     
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tenure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cubic Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group All Employees GS 13-15 Supervisors Career SES 
N 17,529,543 2,618,289 2,788,868 103,346 
This table includes the estimated coefficients from turnover models for four groups of employees – all, GS 
13-15, employees in a supervisory role, and career Senior Executive Service employees. T-ratios based on 
robust standard errors clustered by employee are reported in parentheses.  
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Table B3: Occupation Category x Duty Station Fixed Effects 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Year 1 -0.002 
(-10.10) 
-0.004 
(-11.27) 
0.002 
(6.92) 
0.017 
(7.48) 
Ideological 
Mismatch 
0.002 
(12.91) 
0.001 
(2.55) 
0.003 
(7.90) 
0.006 
(6.54) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-0.001 
(-24.67) 
-4.35 x 10
-4
 
(-3.65) 
-0.001 
(-12.30) 
-0.005 
(-5.85) 
Female -0.004 
(-27.46) 
0.002 
(6.51) 
0.001 
(4.02) 
-0.001 
(-0.46) 
A.I./A.N. -0.001 
(-2.31) 
0.002 
(1.50) 
3.25 x 10
-4
 
(0.34) 
-0.004 
(-0.45) 
Asian -0.011 
(-34.56) 
-0.010 
(-18.90) 
-0.010 
(-12.90) 
-0.011 
(-1.87) 
Black -0.003 
(-20.72) 
-0.010 
(-26.09) 
-0.008 
(-20.02) 
-0.013 
(-4.89) 
Hispanic -0.007 
(-24.16) 
-0.002 
(-3.98) 
-0.005 
(-7.97) 
-0.005 
(-0.99) 
Age -0.017 
(-281.87) 
-0.014 
(-87.33) 
-0.015 
(-76.98) 
-0.010 
(-6.17) 
Age
2
 2.03 x 10
-4
 
(-281.87) 
1.69 x 10
-4
 
(94.24) 
1.92 x 10
-4
 
(90.33) 
1.30 x 10
-4
 
(8.14) 
Education -0.001 
(-23.81) 
-5.60 x 10
-5
 
(-0.88) 
-0.002 
(-29.88) 
-0.002 
(-5.20) 
Tenure     
     
Tenure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occ Cat x DS 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cubic Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group All Employees GS 13-15 Supervisors Career SES 
N 17,529,027 2,618,289 2,788,849 103,340 
This table includes the estimated coefficients from turnover models for four groups of employees – all, GS 
13-15, employees in a supervisory role, and career Senior Executive Service employees. T-ratios based on 
robust standard errors clustered by employee are reported in parentheses.  
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Table B4: Occupation-Specific Unemployment Rate Effects 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Year 1 -0.001 
(-8.23) 
-0.004 
(-12.54) 
0.003 
(7.12) 
0.016 
(7.00) 
Ideological 
Mismatch 
0.004 
(21.71) 
0.001 
(4.05) 
0.003 
(8.73) 
0.006 
(3.03) 
Female -0.003 
(-23.95) 
0.001 
(2.96) 
0.001 
(2.81) 
3.56 x 10
-4
 
(0.19) 
A.I./A.N. 0.003 
(6.88) 
0.003 
(2.83) 
0.003 
(2.73) 
-4.69 x 10
-4
 
(-0.06) 
Asian -0.009 
(-31.14) 
-0.009 
(-17.63) 
-0.009 
(-10.80) 
-0.011 
(-1.80) 
Black -0.006 
(-40.22) 
-0.011 
(-28.56) 
-0.009 
(-22.91) 
-0.016 
(-5.84) 
Hispanic -0.004 
(-17.21) 
-0.003 
(4.03) 
-0.004 
(-6.25) 
-0.007 
(-1.38) 
Age -0.016 
(-279.74) 
-0.014 
(-87.09) 
-0.015 
(-77.59) 
-0.011 
(-6.83) 
Age
2
 1.99 x 10
-4
 
(304.33) 
-1.57 x 10
-4
 
(93.81) 
1.92 x 10
-4
 
(91.16) 
1.39 x 10
-4
 
(8.82) 
Education -3.88 x 10
-4
 
(-11.36) 
-1.57 x 10
-4
 
(-2.23) 
-0.002 
(-21.70) 
-0.002 
(-3.71) 
     
Occupation-
Specific Unemp 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tenure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation x 
Unemployment 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cubic Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group All Employees GS 13-15 Supervisors Career SES 
N 17,529,543 2,618,289 2,788,868 103,346 
This table includes the estimated coefficients from turnover models for four groups of employees – all, GS 
13-15, employees in a supervisory role, and career Senior Executive Service employees. T-ratios based on 
robust standard errors clustered by employee are reported in parentheses.  
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Table B5: Occupation x Duty Station x Year Fixed Effects 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ideological 
Mismatch 
0.002 
(13.35) 
0.001 
(2.21) 
0.002 
(4.82) 
0.002 
(0.83) 
Female -0.003 
(-23.10) 
0.001 
(3.28) 
0.001 
(2.58) 
-2.93 x 10
-4
 
(-0.15) 
A.I./A.N. -0.002 
(-4.32) 
0.001 
(0.44) 
-0.001 
(-1.43) 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
Asian -0.011 
(-35.60) 
-0.009 
(-17.36) 
-0.008 
(-10.34) 
-0.011 
(-1.88) 
Black -0.005 
(-32.99) 
-0.010 
(-27.21) 
-0.009 
(-22.05) 
-0.015 
(-5.38) 
Hispanic -0.007 
(-25.08) 
-0.003 
(-5.38) 
-0.005 
(-8.21) 
-0.006 
(-1.07) 
Age -0.016 
(-279.52) 
-0.014 
(-87.41) 
-0.015 
(-78.01) 
-0.011 
(-6.70) 
Age
2
 1.98 x 10
-4
 
(303.56) 
1.70 x 10
-4
 
(94.12) 
1.93 x 10
-4
 
(91.52) 
1.38 x 10
-4
 
(8.69) 
Education -2.17 x 10
-4
 
(-9.22) 
-9.12 x 10
-5
 
(-1.29) 
-0.002 
(-19.27) 
-0.002 
(-3.76) 
     
Tenure FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occ. Cat x Duty 
Station x Year 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Agency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Group All Employees GS 13-15 Supervisors Career SES 
N 17,529,027 2,618,289 2,788,849 103,340 
This table includes the estimated coefficients from turnover models for four groups of employees – all, GS 
13-15, employees in a supervisory role, and career Senior Executive Service employees. Unlike those 
reported in the main text, these models include occupation category-state-year fixed effects in order to 
account for local labor market effects in the broadest way possible. Including these additional variables, 
however, leads us to remove the unemployment rate and Year 1 variables from the analysis because they are 
perfectly collinear with the fixed effects in the analysis. T-ratios based on robust standard errors clustered by 
employee are reported in parentheses.  
 
